1977年致伯克希尔股东的信

原文来源：Berkshire Hathaway Letters

To the Stockholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc.:

致伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）全体股东：

Operating earnings in 1977 of $21,904,000, or $22.54 per share, were moderately better than anticipated a year ago. Of these earnings, $1.43 per share resulted from substantial realized capital gains by Blue Chip Stamps which, to the extent of our proportional interest in that company, are included in our operating earnings figure. Capital gains or losses realized directly by Berkshire Hathaway Inc. or its insurance subsidiaries are not included in our calculation of operating earnings. While too much attention should not be paid to the figure for any single year, over the longer term the record regarding aggregate capital gains or losses obviously is of significance.

1977年的经营利润为21,904,000美元，合每股22.54美元，较一年前的预期略好。其中每股1.43美元来自蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）可观的已实现资本利得，按照我们在这家公司所占的股权比例，这部分收益已计入我们的经营利润数字中。伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）或其保险子公司直接实现的资本利得或损失，则未计入我们的经营利润计算。尽管不应过分关注单一年度的数字，但从长期来看，资本利得或损失的总体记录显然具有重要意义。

Textile operations came in well below forecast, while the results of the Illinois National Bank as well as the operating earnings attributable to our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps were about as anticipated. However, insurance operations, led again by the truly outstanding results of Phil Liesche’s managerial group at National Indemnity Company, were even better than our optimistic expectations.

纺织业务的表现远低于预期，而伊利诺伊国民银行（Illinois National Bank）的业绩以及按我们在蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）股权比例计算的经营利润则基本符合预期。然而，保险业务再次凭借国民保险公司（National Indemnity Company）菲尔·利什（Phil Liesche）管理团队真正出色的业绩，比我们乐观的预期还要好。

Most companies define “record” earnings as a new high in earnings per share. Since businesses customarily add from year to year to their equity base, we find nothing particularly noteworthy in a management performance combining, say, a 10% increase in equity capital and a 5% increase in earnings per share. After all, even a totally dormant savings account will produce steadily rising interest earnings each year because of compounding.

大多数公司将“创纪录”盈利定义为每股收益创出新高。由于企业通常每年都会增加其权益资本基数，因此，若管理层业绩表现为权益资本增长10%而每股收益增长5%，我们认为这并无特别值得称道之处。毕竟，即使是一个完全闲置的储蓄账户，由于复利效应，每年的利息收益也会稳步增长。

Except for special cases (for example, companies with unusual debt-equity ratios or those with important assets carried at unrealistic balance sheet values), we believe a more appropriate measure of managerial economic performance to be return on equity capital. In 1977 our operating earnings on beginning equity capital amounted to 19%, slightly better than last year and above both our own long-term average and that of American industry in aggregate. But, while our operating earnings per share were up 37% from the year before, our beginning capital was up 24%, making the gain in earnings per share considerably less impressive than it might appear at first glance.

除了一些特殊情况（例如负债权益比率异常的公司，或重要资产按不切实际的资产负债表价值计价的公司），我们认为衡量管理层经济业绩更为恰当的指标是权益资本回报率。1977年，我们按年初权益资本计算的营业收益率为19%，略高于去年，也高于我们自身的长期平均水平以及美国工业的整体水平。然而，虽然我们的每股收益较上年增长了37%，但年初资本也增长了24%，因此每股收益的增长远没有乍一看那么令人印象深刻。

We expect difficulty in matching our 1977 rate of return during the forthcoming year. Beginning equity capital is up 23% from a year ago, and we expect the trend of insurance underwriting profit margins to turn down well before the end of the year. Nevertheless, we expect a reasonably good year and our present estimate, subject to the usual caveats regarding the frailties of forecasts, is that operating earnings will improve somewhat on a per share basis during 1978.

我们预计下一年很难达到1977年的回报率。年初权益资本较去年同期增长了23%，同时我们预计保险承保利润率的趋势将在年底前明显走弱。尽管如此，我们预计1978年仍将是一个相当不错的年份；按照目前对预测可靠性的一贯保留意见，我们初步估计1978年的每股营业收益将会有所改善。

Textile Operations

纺织业务

The textile business again had a very poor year in 1977. We have mistakenly predicted better results in each of the last two years. This may say something about our forecasting abilities, the nature of the textile industry, or both. Despite strenuous efforts, problems in marketing and manufacturing have persisted. Many difficulties experienced in the marketing area are due primarily to industry conditions, but some of the problems have been of our own making.

1977年，纺织业务再次表现极差。过去两年，我们都错误地预计了更好的业绩。这或许说明了我们的预测能力、纺织行业的特性，或两者兼而有之。尽管付出了巨大努力，营销和生产方面的问题依然存在。营销领域的诸多困难主要源于行业状况，但也有一些问题是我们自身造成的。

A few shareholders have questioned the wisdom of remaining in the textile business which, over the longer term, is unlikely to produce returns on capital comparable to those available in many other businesses. Our reasons are several: (1) Our mills in both New Bedford and Manchester are among the largest employers in each town, utilizing a labor force of high average age possessing relatively non-transferable skills. Our workers and unions have exhibited unusual understanding and effort in cooperating with management to achieve a cost structure and product mix which might allow us to maintain a viable operation. (2) Management also has been energetic and straightforward in its approach to our textile problems. In particular, Ken Chace’s efforts after the change in corporate control took place in 1965 generated capital from the textile division needed to finance the acquisition and expansion of our profitable insurance operation. (3) With hard work and some imagination regarding manufacturing and marketing configurations, it seems reasonable that at least modest profits in the textile division can be achieved in the future.

少数股东质疑继续留在纺织业是否明智；从长远来看，该行业不太可能产生可与许多其他业务相媲美的资本回报。我们的理由如下：(1) 我们位于 New Bedford（新贝德福德）和 Manchester（曼彻斯特）的工厂分别是各自城镇最大的雇主之一，所用劳动力平均年龄较高，技能相对难以转移。我们的员工和工会表现出罕见的理解与努力，配合管理层以建立能够使我们维持可行经营的成本结构和产品组合。(2) 管理层在应对纺织问题方面也一直积极而坦率。特别是，1965年公司控制权变更后，Ken Chace（肯·蔡斯）的努力使纺织部门产生了资金，用于为收购和扩展我们盈利的保险业务提供融资。(3) 凭借辛勤工作以及对生产和营销布局的一些创新，未来纺织部门至少实现适度盈利似乎是合理的。

Insurance Underwriting

保险承保

Our insurance operation continued to grow significantly in 1977. It was early in 1967 that we made our entry into this industry through the purchase of National Indemnity Company and National Fire and Marine Insurance Company (sister companies) for approximately $8.6 million. In that year their premium volume amounted to $22 million. In 1977 our aggregate insurance premium volume was $151 million. No additional shares of Berkshire Hathaway stock have been issued to achieve any of this growth.

1977年，我们的保险业务继续显著增长。早在1967年初，我们通过以约860万美元收购National Indemnity Company（国民赔偿公司）和National Fire and Marine Insurance Company（国民火灾与海事保险公司）（姊妹公司）进入该行业。当年，它们的保费收入为2200万美元。1977年，我们的保险总保费收入为1.51亿美元。这一增长没有通过增发Berkshire Hathaway（伯克希尔·哈撒韦）股票来实现。

Rather, this almost 600% increase has been achieved through large gains in National Indemnity’s traditional liability areas plus the starting of new companies (Cornhusker Casualty Company in 1970, Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company in 1971, Texas United Insurance Company in 1972, The Insurance Company of Iowa in 1973, and Kansas Fire and Casualty Company in late 1977), the purchase for cash of other insurance companies (Home and Automobile Insurance Company in 1971, Kerkling Reinsurance Corporation, now named Central Fire and Casualty Company, in 1976, and Cypress Insurance Company at yearend 1977), and finally through the marketing of additional products, most significantly reinsurance, within the National Indemnity Company corporate structure.

恰恰相反，这一近600%的增长主要得益于国民赔偿公司传统责任险业务的大幅增长，以及设立新公司（1970年的Cornhusker Casualty Company（康胡斯克意外险公司）、1971年的Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company（莱克兰火灾与意外险公司）、1972年的Texas United Insurance Company（德克萨斯联合保险公司）、1973年的The Insurance Company of Iowa（爱荷华保险公司）和1977年末的Kansas Fire and Casualty Company（堪萨斯火灾与意外险公司）），以现金收购其他保险公司（1971年的Home and Automobile Insurance Company（家庭与汽车保险公司）、1976年的Kerkling Reinsurance Corporation（柯克林再保险公司），现更名为Central Fire and Casualty Company（中央火灾与意外险公司），以及1977年末的Cypress Insurance Company（赛普拉斯保险公司）），最后还有在国民赔偿公司组织架构内销售更多产品，其中最重要的是再保险。

In aggregate, the insurance business has worked out very well. But it hasn’t been a one-way street. Some major mistakes have been made during the decade, both in products and personnel. We experienced significant problems from (1) a surety operation initiated in 1969, (2) the 1973 expansion of Home and Automobile’s urban auto marketing into the Miami, Florida area, (3) a still unresolved aviation “fronting” arrangement, and (4) our Worker’s Compensation operation in California, which we believe retains an interesting potential upon completion of a reorganization now in progress. It is comforting to be in a business where some mistakes can be made and yet a quite satisfactory overall performance can be achieved. In a sense, this is the opposite case from our textile business where even very good management probably can average only modest results. One of the lessons your management has learned - and, unfortunately, sometimes re-learned - is the importance of being in businesses where tailwinds prevail rather than headwinds.

总体而言，保险业务的经营结果非常出色。但它并非一帆风顺。过去十年里，我们在产品和人员方面都犯过一些重大错误。我们遭遇的重大问题包括：(1) 1969年启动的一项担保业务，(2) 1973年将Home and Automobile（家庭与汽车保险公司）的城市汽车营销业务扩展至佛罗里达州迈阿密地区，(3) 一项迄今尚未解决的航空"fronting"（代出单）安排，以及(4) 我们在加利福尼亚州的Worker's Compensation（工人赔偿保险）业务——我们相信，在完成目前正在进行中的重组后，该项业务仍具有可观潜力。身处一个可以犯错、却依然能取得相当令人满意整体业绩的行业，令人欣慰。从某种意义上说，这与我们的纺织业务截然相反——在纺织业，即便管理非常出色，平均而言大概也只能取得平平业绩。管理层学到的一个教训——不幸的是，有时需要反复学习——就是要从事那些顺风而非逆风的业务。

In 1977 the winds in insurance underwriting were squarely behind us. Very large rate increases were effected throughout the industry in 1976 to offset the disastrous underwriting results of 1974 and 1975. But, because insurance policies typically are written for one-year periods, with pricing mistakes capable of correction only upon renewal, it was 1977 before the full impact was felt upon earnings of those earlier rate increases.

1977年，保险承保业务的风向完全站在我们这边。1976年，整个行业实施了大幅费率上调，以弥补1974年和1975年灾难性的承保业绩。但由于保险单通常按一年期签订，定价错误只能在续保时才能纠正，因此直到1977年，此前费率上调对收益的全面影响才得以体现。

The pendulum now is beginning to swing the other way. We estimate that costs involved in the insurance areas in which we operate rise at close to 1% per month. This is due to continuous monetary inflation affecting the cost of repairing humans and property, as well as “social inflation”, a broadening definition by society and juries of what is covered by insurance policies. Unless rates rise at a comparable 1% per month, underwriting profits must shrink. Recently the pace of rate increases has slowed dramatically, and it is our expectation that underwriting margins generally will be declining by the second half of the year.

如今钟摆开始转向另一边。我们估计，在我们所从事的保险领域，成本每月上升近1%。这既是因为持续的货币通胀推高了医治人身与修复财产的成本，也是因为"社会性通胀"——社会和陪审团对保单承保范围的界定不断扩大。除非费率也以每月约1%的可比速度上涨，否则承保利润必然缩水。最近，费率上涨的步伐已大幅放缓，我们预计，总体而言，承保利润率将在今年下半年开始下降。

We must again give credit to Phil Liesche, greatly assisted by Roland Miller in Underwriting and Bill Lyons in Claims, for an extraordinary underwriting achievement in National Indemnity’s traditional auto and general liability business during 1977. Large volume gains have been accompanied by excellent underwriting margins following contraction or withdrawal by many competitors in the wake of the 1974-75 crisis period. These conditions will reverse before long. In the meantime, National Indemnity’s underwriting profitability has increased dramatically and, in addition, large sums have been made available for investment. As markets loosen and rates become inadequate, we again will face the challenge of philosophically accepting reduced volume. Unusual managerial discipline will be required, as it runs counter to normal institutional behavior to let the other fellow take away business - even at foolish prices.

1977年，国民赔偿公司（National Indemnity）在传统汽车险和一般责任险业务上取得了非凡的承保业绩，这主要归功于菲尔·利什（Phil Liesche），并得力于承保部门的罗兰德·米勒（Roland Miller）和理赔部门的比尔·莱昂斯（Bill Lyons）的大力协助。在1974-75年危机过后，许多竞争对手收缩或退出市场，因此国民赔偿公司在保费规模大幅增长的同时，也实现了优异的承保利润率。不过，这种局面不会持续太久。在此期间，国民赔偿公司的承保盈利能力大幅提升，同时又有大量资金可用于投资。当市场趋于宽松、费率变得不足时，我们将再次面临从理念上接受业务量减少的挑战。这需要非同寻常的管理纪律，因为任由竞争对手以荒唐的价格抢走业务，是与正常的机构行为相违背的。

Our reinsurance department, managed by George Young, improved its underwriting performance during 1977. Although the combined ratio (see definition on page 12) of 107.1 was unsatisfactory, its trend was downward throughout the year. In addition, reinsurance generates unusually high funds for investment as a percentage of premium volume.

1977年，由乔治·杨（George Young）管理的再保险部门的承保业绩有所改善。尽管综合成本率（combined ratio，定义见第12页）为107.1，尚不能令人满意，但这一指标全年呈下降趋势。此外，相对于保费规模而言，再保险业务产生了异常可观的投资资金。

At Home and Auto, John Seward continued to make progress on all fronts. John was a battlefield promotion several years ago when Home and Auto’s underwriting was awash in red ink and the company faced possible extinction. Under his management it currently is sound, profitable, and growing.

在家庭与汽车保险公司（Home and Auto），约翰·苏厄德（John Seward）在各个方面继续取得进展。几年前，当家庭与汽车保险公司的承保业务深陷亏损、公司面临可能消亡的危机时，约翰临危受命获得提拔。在他的管理下，公司目前财务状况稳健、盈利且不断增长。

John Ringwalt’s homestate operation now consists of five companies, with Kansas Fire and Casualty Company becoming operational late in 1977 under the direction of Floyd Taylor. The homestate companies had net premium volume of $23 million, up from $5.5 million just three years ago. All four companies that operated throughout the year achieved combined ratios below 100, with Cornhusker Casualty Company, at 93.8, the leader. In addition to actively supervising the other four homestate operations, John Ringwalt manages the operations of Cornhusker which has recorded combined ratios below 100 in six of its seven full years of existence and, from a standing start in 1970, has grown to be one of the leading insurance companies operating in Nebraska utilizing the conventional independent agency system. Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company, managed by Jim Stodolka, was the winner of the Chairman’s Cup in 1977 for achieving the lowest loss ratio among the homestate companies. All in all, the homestate operation continues to make excellent progress.

约翰·林沃尔特（John Ringwalt）负责的本土州业务目前由五家公司组成，其中堪萨斯火灾与意外险公司（Kansas Fire and Casualty Company）在弗洛伊德·泰勒（Floyd Taylor）的领导下于1977年底开始运营。这些本土州公司的净保费收入达到2,300万美元，而仅仅三年前只有550万美元。全年运营的四家公司综合成本率均低于100，其中玉米壳者意外险公司（Cornhusker Casualty Company）以93.8位居榜首。除了积极监管其他四家本土州公司的业务外，约翰·林沃尔特还负责管理玉米壳者公司的运营；该公司自1970年从零起步，在七个完整经营年度中有六个年度综合成本率低于100，并已成长为内布拉斯加州采用传统独立代理人制度运营的主要保险公司之一。由吉姆·斯托多尔卡（Jim Stodolka）管理的莱克兰火灾与意外险公司（Lakeland Fire and Casualty Company）因在所有本土州公司中赔付率最低，荣获1977年“董事长杯”。总而言之，本土州业务继续取得优异进展。

The newest addition to our insurance group is Cypress Insurance Company of South Pasadena, California. This Worker’s Compensation insurer was purchased for cash in the final days of 1977 and, therefore, its approximate $12.5 million of volume for that year was not included in our results. Cypress and National Indemnity’s present California Worker’s Compensation operation will not be combined, but will operate independently utilizing somewhat different marketing strategies. Milt Thornton, President of Cypress since 1968, runs a first-class operation for policyholders, agents, employees and owners alike. We look forward to working with him.

我们保险集团最新的成员是位于加利福尼亚州南帕萨迪纳的柏树保险公司（Cypress Insurance Company）。这家工伤赔偿保险公司于1977年最后几天以现金收购，因此其当年约1,250万美元的保费收入未计入我们的业绩。柏树公司与国民赔偿公司（National Indemnity）目前在加利福尼亚州的工伤赔偿业务不会合并，而是将采用略有不同的营销策略独立运营。自1968年起担任柏树公司总裁的米尔顿·桑顿（Milt Thornton）为投保人、代理人、员工及所有者经营着一流的业务。我们期待与他合作。

Insurance companies offer standardized policies which can be copied by anyone. Their only products are promises. It is not difficult to be licensed, and rates are an open book. There are no important advantages from trademarks, patents, location, corporate longevity, raw material sources, etc., and very little consumer differentiation to produce insulation from competition. It is commonplace, in corporate annual reports, to stress the difference that people make. Sometimes this is true and sometimes it isn’t. But there is no question that the nature of the insurance business magnifies the effect which individual managers have on company performance. We are very fortunate to have the group of managers that are associated with us.

保险公司提供的是标准化保单，任何人都可以复制。它们唯一的产品就是承诺。取得经营许可并不困难，费率也是公开透明的。商标、专利、地理位置、企业存续时间、原材料来源等均无法带来重要优势，也几乎没有消费者差异化能够使其免受竞争影响。在企业年报中，强调人的作用屡见不鲜。有时确实如此，有时则不然。但毫无疑问，保险业务的特性放大了管理者个人对公司业绩的影响。我们非常幸运能拥有与我们一起合作的这一管理团队。

Insurance Investments

保险投资

During the past two years insurance investments at cost (excluding the investment in our affiliate, Blue Chip Stamps) have grown from $134.6 million to $252.8 million. Growth in insurance reserves, produced by our large gain in premium volume, plus retained earnings, have accounted for this increase in marketable securities. In turn, net investment income of the Insurance Group has improved from $8.4 million pre-tax in 1975 to $12.3 million pre-tax in 1977.

在过去两年中，保险投资按成本计算（不包括我们对联营公司 Blue Chip Stamps（蓝筹印花公司）的投资）已从1.346亿美元增至2.528亿美元。这一有价证券的增长，源于保费规模大幅增加所带来的保险准备金增长，以及留存收益。相应地，Insurance Group（保险集团）的投资净收益已从1975年的税前840万美元提升至1977年的税前1230万美元。

In addition to this income from dividends and interest, we realized capital gains of $6.9 million before tax, about one- quarter from bonds and the balance from stocks. Our unrealized gain in stocks at yearend 1977 was approximately $74 million but this figure, like any other figure of a single date (we had an unrealized loss of $17 million at the end of 1974), should not be taken too seriously. Most of our large stock positions are going to be held for many years and the scorecard on our investment decisions will be provided by business results over that period, and not by prices on any given day. Just as it would be foolish to focus unduly on short-term prospects when acquiring an entire company, we think it equally unsound to become mesmerized by prospective near term earnings or recent trends in earnings when purchasing small pieces of a company; i.e., marketable common stocks.

除股息和利息收入外，我们还实现了税前690万美元的资本利得，其中约四分之一来自债券，其余来自股票。截至1977年末，我们股票的未实现利得约为7400万美元，但这一数字，如同任何单日数据一样（我们在1974年底曾有过1700万美元的未实现亏损），不应被过于看重。我们的大部分重仓股票将持有多年，这段时间内企业的经营成果才是我们投资决策的成绩单，而非某一天的股价。正如收购整家公司时过分关注短期前景是愚蠢的，我们认为在购买一家公司的一小部分，即可流通普通股时，被预期的近期收益或近期收益趋势所迷惑同样是不合理的。

A little digression illustrating this point may be interesting. Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates and Hathaway Manufacturing were merged in 1955 to form Berkshire Hathaway Inc. In 1948, on a pro forma combined basis, they had earnings after tax of almost $18 million and employed 10,000 people at a dozen large mills throughout New England. In the business world of that period they were an economic powerhouse. For example, in that same year earnings of IBM were $28 million (now $2.7 billion), Safeway Stores, $10 million, Minnesota Mining, $13 million, and Time, Inc., $9 million. But, in the decade following the 1955 merger aggregate sales of $595 million produced an aggregate loss for Berkshire Hathaway of $10 million. By 1964 the operation had been reduced to two mills and net worth had shrunk to $22 million, from $53 million at the time of the merger. So much for single year snapshots as adequate portrayals of a business.

举个例子来说明这一点，或许会很有趣。伯克希尔精细纺纱联合公司（Berkshire Fine Spinning Associates）与哈撒韦制造公司（Hathaway Manufacturing）于1955年合并，成立了伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司（Berkshire Hathaway Inc.）。1948年，按模拟合并基础计算，它们的税后盈利接近1,800万美元，并雇佣了10,000名员工，在新英格兰各地拥有12家大型工厂。在当时的商界，它们可谓是一支经济劲旅。例如，同年IBM（国际商业机器公司）的盈利为2,800万美元（现为27亿美元），Safeway Stores（西夫韦连锁超市）为1,000万美元，Minnesota Mining（明尼苏达矿业）为1,300万美元，Time, Inc.（时代公司）为900万美元。然而，在1955年合并后的十年间，伯克希尔·哈撒韦的总销售额达5.95亿美元，却累计亏损了1,000万美元。到1964年，业务已缩减至两家工厂，净资产从合并时的5,300万美元缩水至2,200万美元。由此可见，单一年度的快照并不足以充分刻画一家企业。

Equity holdings of our insurance companies with a market value of over $5 million on December 31, 1977 were as follows:

截至1977年12月31日，我们保险公司持有、市值超过500万美元的股票投资如下：

No. of Shares Company Cost Market ------------- ------- -------- -------- (000’s omitted) 220,000 Capital Cities Communications, Inc. ..... $ 10,909 $ 13,228 1,986,953 Government Employees Insurance Company Convertible Preferred ........ 19,417 33,033 1,294,308 Government Employees Insurance Company Common Stock ................. 4,116 10,516 592,650 The Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc. 4,531 17,187 324,580 Kaiser Aluminum& Chemical Corporation ... 11,218 9,981 1,305,800 Kaiser Industries, Inc. ................. 778 6,039 226,900 Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc. .......... 7,534 8,736 170,800 Ogilvy & Mather International, Inc. ..... 2,762 6,960 934,300 The Washington Post Company Class B ..... 10,628 33,401 -------- -------- Total ................................... $ 71,893 $139,081 All Other Holdings ...................... 34,996 41,992 -------- -------- Total Equities .......................... $106,889 $181,073 ======== ========

（单位：千美元，已省略） 股数　　　　　　公司　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　成本　　　市值 -------------　-------　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　--------　-------- 220,000　　Capital Cities Communications, Inc.（首府城市通讯公司） ..... $10,909　$13,228 1,986,953　Government Employees Insurance Company（政府雇员保险公司）可转换优先股 ........ $19,417　$33,033 1,294,308　政府雇员保险公司普通股 ................. $4,116　$10,516 592,650　　The Interpublic Group of Companies, Inc.（埃培智集团）　　 $4,531　$17,187 324,580　　Kaiser Aluminum & Chemical Corporation（凯撒铝业及化学公司） ... $11,218　$9,981 1,305,800　Kaiser Industries, Inc.（凯撒工业公司） ................. $778　$6,039 226,900　　Knight-Ridder Newspapers, Inc.（奈特-里德报业公司） .......... $7,534　$8,736 170,800　　Ogilvy & Mather International, Inc.（奥美国际公司） ..... $2,762　$6,960 934,300　　The Washington Post Company Class B（华盛顿邮报公司B类股） ..... $10,628　$33,401 　　　　　　合计 ................................... $71,893　$139,081 　　　　　　其他持股 ...................... $34,996　$41,992 　　　　　　股票合计 .......................... $106,889　$181,073

We select our marketable equity securities in much the same way we would evaluate a business for acquisition in its entirety. We want the business to be (1) one that we can understand, (2) with favorable long-term prospects, (3) operated by honest and competent people, and (4) available at a very attractive price. We ordinarily make no attempt to buy equities for anticipated favorable stock price behavior in the short term. In fact, if their business experience continues to satisfy us, we welcome lower market prices of stocks we own as an opportunity to acquire even more of a good thing at a better price.

我们挑选有价权益证券的方式，与评估整体收购一家企业的方式大致相同。我们希望这家企业符合四个条件：（1）我们能够理解；（2）具有有利的长期前景；（3）由诚实且能干的人经营；（4）价格极具吸引力。通常，我们不会为了预期短期股价表现良好而买入股票。事实上，如果所投资企业的经营状况持续令我们满意，我们欢迎其股价下跌，因为这让我们有机会以更好的价格买入更多好东西。

Our experience has been that pro-rata portions of truly outstanding businesses sometimes sell in the securities markets at very large discounts from the prices they would command in negotiated transactions involving entire companies. Consequently, bargains in business ownership, which simply are not available directly through corporate acquisition, can be obtained indirectly through stock ownership. When prices are appropriate, we are willing to take very large positions in selected companies, not with any intention of taking control and not foreseeing sell-out or merger, but with the expectation that excellent business results by corporations will translate over the long term into correspondingly excellent market value and dividend results for owners, minority as well as majority.

我们的经验是，真正杰出企业的按比例权益份额，有时在证券市场上的售价，较之整家公司进行协议交易时所能获得的价格，存在很大折扣。因此，那些通过直接收购公司根本无法获得的企业所有权便宜货，却可以通过持股间接获得。当价格合适时，我们愿意在精选的公司中持有非常大的仓位，但并非有意取得控制权，也不预期公司会被出售或合并，而是期待企业优异的经营成果，长期来看会相应转化为所有者的优异市值与股息回报——少数股东与控股股东皆然。

Such investments initially may have negligible impact on our operating earnings. For example, we invested $10.9 million in Capital Cities Communications during 1977. Earnings attributable to the shares we purchased totaled about $1.3 million last year. But only the cash dividend, which currently provides $40,000 annually, is reflected in our operating earnings figure.

这类投资在最初对我们的营业利润可能几乎没有影响。例如，1977年我们在Capital Cities Communications（首府城市传播公司）投资了1090万美元。我们所购股份去年对应的盈利总计约130万美元，但只有现金股息——目前每年约4万美元——计入我们的营业利润。

Capital Cities possesses both extraordinary properties and extraordinary management. And these management skills extend equally to operations and employment of corporate capital. To purchase, directly, properties such as Capital Cities owns would cost in the area of twice our cost of purchase via the stock market, and direct ownership would offer no important advantages to us. While control would give us the opportunity - and the responsibility - to manage operations and corporate resources, we would not be able to provide management in either of those respects equal to that now in place. In effect, we can obtain a better management result through non-control than control. This is an unorthodox view, but one we believe to be sound.

Capital Cities（首都城市通信公司）既拥有出色的资产，也拥有杰出的管理层；而且这些管理才能同样体现在运营和公司资本的配置上。若要直接收购首都城市公司所拥有的这类资产，其成本大约会是我们通过股票市场买入股票所付出代价的两倍，况且直接持有也不会给我们带来任何重要优势。虽然取得控制权会让我们有机会——也有责任——去管理运营和公司资源，但在这两方面，我们都无法提供与现有管理层相媲美的管理水平。实际上，通过不控股，我们能获得比控股更好的管理结果。这是一种非正统的观点，但我们认为是站得住脚的。

Banking

银行业务

In 1977 the Illinois National Bank continued to achieve a rate of earnings on assets about three times that of most large banks. As usual, this record was achieved while the bank paid maximum rates to savers and maintained an asset position combining low risk and exceptional liquidity. Gene Abegg formed the bank in 1931 with $250,000. In its first full year of operation, earnings amounted to $8,782. Since that time, no new capital has been contributed to the bank; on the contrary, since our purchase in 1969, dividends of $20 million have been paid. Earnings in 1977 amounted to $3.6 million, more than achieved by many banks two or three times its size.

1977年，Illinois National Bank（伊利诺伊国民银行）继续实现了约为其资产收益率三倍于多数大型银行的水平。与往常一样，这一业绩是在银行向储户支付最高利率，并保持低风险与极强流动性相结合的资产状况的同时取得的。Gene Abegg（吉恩·阿贝格）于1931年以25万美元创办了这家银行。在其首个完整经营年度，盈利为8,782美元。自那时起，银行没有注入任何新资本；相反，自1969年我们收购以来，已派发2,000万美元股息。1977年盈利达360万美元，超过了许多规模是其两三倍的银行。

Late last year Gene, now 80 and still running a banking operation without peer, asked that a successor be brought in. Accordingly, Peter Jeffrey, formerly President and Chief Executive Officer of American National Bank of Omaha, has joined the Illinois National Bank effective March 1st as President and Chief Executive Officer.

去年年底，现年80岁的吉恩（Gene）仍然经营着一家无人能及的银行，他提出希望引入一位继任者。因此，彼得·杰弗里（Peter Jeffrey）——原奥马哈美国国民银行（American National Bank of Omaha）总裁兼首席执行官——已于3月1日起出任伊利诺伊国民银行（Illinois National Bank）总裁兼首席执行官。

Gene continues in good health as Chairman. We expect a continued successful operation at Rockford’s leading bank.

吉恩（Gene）身体状况良好，继续担任董事长。我们预计罗克福德（Rockford）这家领先的银行将继续取得成功运营。

Blue Chip Stamps

蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）

We again increased our equity interest in Blue Chip Stamps, and owned approximately 36 1/2% at the end of 1977. Blue Chip had a fine year, earning approximately $12.9 million from operations and, in addition, had realized securities gains of $4.1 million.

我们进一步增持了蓝筹印花公司（Blue Chip Stamps）的股权，截至1977年底，持股比例约为36.5%。蓝筹印花公司这一年表现优异，经营盈利约1,290万美元，此外还实现了410万美元的证券投资收益。

Both Wesco Financial Corp., an 80% owned subsidiary of Blue Chip Stamps, managed by Louis Vincenti, and See’s Candies, a 99% owned subsidiary, managed by Chuck Huggins, made good progress in 1977. Since See’s was purchased by Blue Chip Stamps at the beginning of 1972, pre-tax operating earnings have grown from $4.2 million to $12.6 million with little additional capital investment. See’s achieved this record while operating in an industry experiencing practically no unit growth. Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. may obtain the annual report of Blue Chip Stamps by requesting it from Mr. Robert H. Bird, Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040.

1977年，Wesco Financial Corp.（Wesco金融公司）——蓝筹印花公司持股80%的子公司，由Louis Vincenti（路易斯·文森蒂）管理；以及See’s Candies（喜诗糖果）——蓝筹印花公司持股99%的子公司，由Chuck Huggins（查克·哈金斯）管理——均取得了良好进展。自1972年初蓝筹印花公司收购喜诗糖果以来，其税前经营利润已从420万美元增长至1,260万美元，且几乎没有追加资本投入。喜诗糖果是在一个几乎没有任何销量增长的行业中取得这一成绩的。Berkshire Hathaway Inc.（伯克希尔·哈撒韦公司）的股东若需要蓝筹印花公司的年报，可向Robert H. Bird（罗伯特·伯德）先生索取，地址：Blue Chip Stamps, 5801 South Eastern Avenue, Los Angeles, California 90040。

Warren E. Buffett, Chairman

沃伦·E·巴菲特（Warren E. Buffett） 董事长

March 14,1978

1978年3月14日